Human factors and missed solutions to Enigma design weaknesses by Harold, Thimbleby
 Cronfa -  Swansea University Open Access Repository
   
_____________________________________________________________
   
This is an author produced version of a paper published in :
Cryptologia
                             
   
Cronfa URL for this paper:
http://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa28818
_____________________________________________________________
 
Paper:
Thimbleby, H. (2016).  Human factors and missed solutions to Enigma design weaknesses. Cryptologia, 40(2), 177-
202.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01611194.2015.1028680
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_____________________________________________________________
  
This article is brought to you by Swansea University. Any person downloading material is agreeing to abide by the
terms of the repository licence. Authors are personally responsible for adhering to publisher restrictions or conditions.
When uploading content they are required to comply with their publisher agreement and the SHERPA RoMEO
database to judge whether or not it is copyright safe to add this version of the paper to this repository. 
http://www.swansea.ac.uk/iss/researchsupport/cronfa-support/ 
 Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=ucry20
Download by: [Swansea University] Date: 18 July 2016, At: 08:11
Cryptologia
ISSN: 0161-1194 (Print) 1558-1586 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ucry20
Human factors and missed solutions to Enigma
design weaknesses
Harold Thimbleby
To cite this article: Harold Thimbleby (2016) Human factors and missed solutions to Enigma
design weaknesses, Cryptologia, 40:2, 177-202
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01611194.2015.1028680
Copyright © Harold Thimbleby
Published online: 19 Oct 2015.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 554
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
CRYPTOLOGIA
2016, VOL. 40, NO. 2, 177–202
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01611194.2015.1028680
Human factors and missed solutions
to Enigma design weaknesses
Harold Thimbleby
ABSTRACT
The German World War II Enigma suffered from design
weaknesses that facilitated its large-scale decryption by the
British throughout the war. The author shows that the main
technical weaknesses (self-coding and reciprocal coding) could
have been avoided using simple contemporary technology, and
therefore the true cause of the weaknesses is not technological
but must be sought elsewhere. Specifically, human factors
issues resulted in the persistent failure to seek out more
effective designs. Similar limitations seem to beset the literature
on the period, which misunderstands the Enigma weaknesses
and therefore inhibits broader thinking about design or
realising the critical role of human factors engineering in
cryptography.
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1. Introduction
The Enigma cryptographic machine was patented by Alfred Scherbius in 1918
and was very widely used particularly during World War II, with the Germans
confident of its security [2, 13]. Its use continued around the world well
after the war, with the British keeping secret that it had been broken on an
industrial scale.
There has been increasing interest in why the Germans were over-confident
in the Enigma’s security [21]. There was certainly systemic failure in the Axis
intelligence system, but this article shows that some of the Enigma’s weaknesses
would have been avoidable had the Axis powers thought through facts that they
“almost” knew but were evidently unwilling or unable to acknowledge. The
Enigma and its operational procedures were continually reviewed throughout
the war, so the persistent oversight to improve its design is surprising.
This article argues that the human factors of design are at least as important
as the human factors of the use of a cryptographic, or indeed of any system.
Any failures in design affect all use regardless of operator culture or training;
design culture is critical and underpins the strengths and weaknesses of all use.
Arguably the human factors of design should be the higher priority: Design
can be undertaken in a managed, experimental, reflective environment, and
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therefore can in principle be done optimally. Design errors can be fixed. In
contrast, particularly in war, operators work in harsh conditions, and it is hard
to work well. Use errors may be catastrophic.
One therefore expects and should design for use error, but more strategi-
cally, one should expect and should design for error in the design process itself.
Errors happen primarily because we do not see them happening, and in design
any unnoticed and unremarked errors will induce further (preventable)
problems in use.
The purpose, then, of this article is to explore some of the design errors and
wider misunderstandings in one system, the German Enigma, and to speculate
on the human factors culture in which they occurred.
2. The role of human factors
The principles that a cryptographic system should be memorable, easy to use
(“usage facile”), and not be stressful for its operators were first stated explicitly
by Auguste Kerckhoffs in 1883 [14]. However, the scientific study and gener-
alisation of these formative human factors ideas did not occur until much later.
Human factors is concerned with the human aspects of the operation of sys-
tems, often emphasising the possible failings of humans. Blaming the “human
factor” or saying the cause of an incident was “human error” has become just
misdirecting jargon to blame a human operator for a mistake. Properly under-
stood, however, human factors is the scientific study of human behaviour with
particular reference to work (e.g., operating machinery or flying aircraft):
demanding tasks that involve attention and multitasking, phenomena that
are known to lower human performance in predictable ways. Human error,
for instance, can be induced by maintaining attention for a long period (caus-
ing fatigue) or multitasking (which induces omission errors). Human factors is
not the study of human “foibles” but of the consistent and predictable factors
of performance and behaviour that are common across individuals.
Human factors is particularly interesting because everyone (i.e., the people
using, not using, or studying it) are humans and therefore subject to the same
bias and error that is the very concern of the field. It is easy for people to ignore
human factors precisely because they are human! Whereas bad engineering
fails and cannot be ignored, people routinely make decisions without the bene-
fit of human factors insights and therefore rarely wonder about trying to make
decisions that could be or could have been better informed by human factors.
In everyday life, errors rarely happen deliberately, but in war, errors are delib-
erately induced and manipulated by an enemy (sometimes as effectively as
stage magicians misdirect us into seeing the impossible), so understanding
human factors is crucial.
For example, confirmation bias is the tendency to preferentially look for
evidence confirming an hypothesis; thus, if the Germans believed the Enigma
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was secure, they would tend to selectively argue from evidence that supported
their view and tend to ignore contradictory evidence, for instance dismissing
it as coincidence. And this happened repeatedly. It should be noted that
confirmation bias is unconscious and not done deliberately; in fact, it is very
hard not to succumb to confirmation bias, since once it has happened, it is
almost impossible to be aware of the poor justification for a decision.
. When German radio controllers in 1943 formed a view that British
aircraft were at some location, they ordered German fighter planes to
intercept them. Those German planes were then detected where the
British were supposed to be, and misidentifying them reinforced the idea
that British planes really were there, so more interceptors would be
sent, further increasing the risk of misidentification [12, p. 381]. The
uncritical reinforcement of the idea is important; humans seek confir-
mation for an idea, get some, and then are reassured, but fail to properly
collect and assess evidence that might not confirm the hypothesis.
. British bombers thought that switching on their IFF (Identification
Friend or Foe) transmissions protected bombers from detection.
Bombers returning successfully had indeed used this technique, but
thanks to confirmation bias, nobody wondered about the absence of data
from the bombers that had failed to return. Later, Enigma decrypts
showed bombers were being shot down because of their IFF transmis-
sions [12, p. 389].
. After an increase in U-boat sinkings in 1941, Admiral Doenitz suspected
the British were reading Enigma messages [13]. The German High
Command proposed many alternative ideas, such as leaks or aerial
reconnaissance, and “exculpated Enigma” [13, p. 260]. The profoundly
worrying possibility that the Enigma was broken thus did not need
hypothesising. In fact, the Allies very rarely took action on Enigma
decrypts alone without first providing deceptive cover (e.g., a fly-over
appearing to engage in aerial reconnaissance) so the Germans had
evidence to confirm its unbroken security.
. In 2015, despite best efforts, this article at one time had 31 unnoticed
incorrect spellings (25%) of Enigma as Engima. Until a spellchecker
was used, the author never noticed because on each reading he read
the words he expected to read. For human factors reasons, certain sorts
of mistake are very hard to see. (The errors were not just caused by the
author’s sloppy proofreading but were also missed by reviewers and
others because all humans find proofreading difficult.)
Winston Churchill, in his 1919 letter to Lord Drogheda [5], wrote that
cryptanalysis “depends for its success more on a study of the psychology of
the persons sending out the messages […] than on careful study and analysis
for which there is no time.” Probably, here Churchill meant studying the
personality and relationships of the sender rather than what we now think of
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as modern human factors, but his advice was certainly adopted; as Batey, who
worked at Bletchley Park, put it, “we pursued [the] operator’s subconscious” [1].
Human factors, then, attempts to understand the principles behind such
phenomena so we can better anticipate problems and evaluate solutions.
Human factors engineering goes up a level: How can we design and build
(engineer) systems that enable humans to work effectively? Thus, in the exam-
ples above, confirmation bias might have been managed by formal teamwork
(e.g., crew resource management), and unnoticed spelling errors, for instance,
could have been handled by designing the word processor to automatically
run a spellchecking tool — it would then have been impossible for the author
to overlook using it!
Enigma operators worked under wartime pressures using complex proce-
dures, the importance of which they may not have fully appreciated. Herivel
[10] gave a famous example, the Herivel Tip or Herivelismus: Under pressure,
tiredness, or even idleness, the operator might not change the Enigma’s rotor
settings as formally required, thus creating a detectable pattern in rotor settings
over several messages that could be exploited by cryptanalysts. Thus, the
Herivelismus describes a human factors weakness in the use of the Enigma.
Had human factors engineering been applied (with any awareness or suspicion
of this potential use problem for the operators) the Enigma might have been
engineered to be better; for example to automatically spin rotors to some
random setting, thus avoiding this human factors weakness in its use.
For many human factors reasons (functional fixedness, the Einstellung effect,
tunnel vision, confirmation bias, and even pride) people are unable or reluctant
to notice, let alone free themselves from assumptions that hold them back. It is
hard to notice, correctly diagnose and then admit that anything can be improved
— it is hard to see how it can be improved more than already achieved. In
contrast, human factors engineering thinking therefore add targeted variation,
teamwork and redundancy to the original “bare” or naïve design process to chal-
lenge predictable human factors from multiple perspectives.
This article is concerned with how the Enigma might have been designed to
be more reliable, given the issues of human factors. We show that it could have
been improved within the reach of contemporary technology and its limita-
tions at the time. Human factors influences the designers of systems, not just
system operators: The designers of the Enigma worked under wartime
pressures and somehow failed to spot flaws in the Enigma’s design. These
design flaws then induced operational flaws the operators themselves could
not have worked around. Additionally, in wartime, the enemy could be
expected to mess with people’s minds, exacerbating problems; in peacetime,
an operator error might lead to an incident that directly exposes human
factors issues, but in war the enemy might conceal the incident to encourage
further errors or actively use hoaxes, subterfuges, deceptions, lies, and other
means to misdirect operators. The Ultra project did this systematically [21].
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Of course, the terms human factors and human factors engineering are
modern, but whatever they are called, there is no evidence that the Enigma’s
operating procedures were subject to any human factor-style analysis (which
might have identified operational failures such as the Herivelismus), but the
design of the Enigma was repeatedly evaluated [21], and features like extra
rotors and the Uhr [30] were introduced. Every time, though, intrinsic
weaknesses were overlooked. This itself is a human factors issue.
This article will show that avoiding the Enigma’s designed-in self-coding
and reciprocal weaknesses would not have been difficult or costly. What
was difficult, because of human factors, was to notice and acknowledge there
was any problem to solve. This blindness to the unnecessary cryptographic
weaknesses of the Enigma is familiar as complication illusoire (security by
obscurity), a well-known fallacy where one mistakenly believes that adding
complexity increases security. The very effort invested (cognitively, socially,
physically, economically) in increasing complexity makes it hard to realise,
let alone admit, that the effort may be ill-conceived, a recognised consequence
of the human factors effect called cognitive dissonance [26]. Perhaps the elec-
tromechanical complexity of the Enigma, which was cutting-edge and perhaps
relatively obscure technology for its day (the obscurity unwittingly enhanced
by secrecy), was sufficient to be complication illusoire?
It is possible the Germans thought the Enigma design so simple it obviously
had no flaws, but this alternate explanation of its unnoticed weaknesses is
unlikely as its repeated evaluation was used to justify arguments about its
security [15, 16, 20, and so on]. Indeed, the British cryptanalyst Gordon
Welchman enjoyed the irony of decrypting Enigma messages, asserting its
continuing security [32].
This article is written many years after the events it discusses. A well-known
human factors problem is hindsight bias, which, for example, bedevils accident
investigations [22, 23]. We now know more than the protagonists possibly
could have, and in hindsight some of them made ill-informed decisions with
outcomes they would have wanted to avoid. At the time, though, the decisions
they made were not foreseen to lead inevitably to the consequences that they
did; that is, in hindsight there was only one path taken, and it could have been
chosen differently, but at the time there were many alternatives, and it was not
so easy to choose as wisely as it may now seem. We say that the designers (the
teams of people responsible for the design and its requirements) at the time lost
situational awareness, meaning by focussing on what seemed to be the task at
hand, the designers lost full awareness of the larger situation, namely the risks
of their critical design choices; yet they probably did not even realise at the time
those choices were critical. Even so, human factors makes it clear that to
perform the design task at all, one must lose some situational awareness. It
is a trade-off: If you worry about everything, you cannot get anything done.
In particular, expertise by its nature is and requires a selective focussing on
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technical details at the expense of “distractions.” Modern human factors
suggests design should involve multidisciplinary teams with authority to raise
broader situational issues to help triage the distractions [23].
In this article, then, “design error” means that the potential problems of the
chosen design were readily available, and that alternative designs that avoided
those problems to varying degrees were also readily available at negligible
marginal cost using reliable, readily-available contemporary technology. In
other words, it is misleading to attribute the failure of the Enigma for its
intended purposes to its reflector or any other specific technical details; it
failed because of a failure in human factors.
Just as Woods and colleagues argue [33] that human error should not be
treated as the cause of accidents but, more profitably, should be seen as a
symptom of underlying problems, this article argues that the flawed design
of the Enigma should not be seen as a cause of its weaknesses so much as a
symptom of underlying problems. In hindsight, then, we can see those under-
lying problems included a lack of human factors applied to its design. There
can, of course, be no useful criticism in lacking something that did not exist
at the time, but today we can learn to apply human factors in new designs
(for cryptography and more) to help ensure success, and we can also improve
our historical discussions so that misunderstandings of the oversights in the
Enigma design are not perpetuated.
3. The enigma and its reciprocal and self-coding weaknesses
The Enigma is a portable, suitcase-sized 26-letter keyboard, much like a
typewriter, but with 26 lettered lamps instead of paper. Each time a key is
pressed, some lamp lights, which gives the code for that key press. In addition,
there is a plugboard (Steckerbrett) and some rotors (which rotate on each key
press), together which change the configuration of the Enigma: Repeatedly
pressing a single key makes lamps light apparently randomly as the rotors
turn and permute the internal wiring. The Enigma is an electromechanical
polyalphabetic cipher machine; an authoritative (previously classified) descrip-
tion of the Enigma was written by Turing [29].
The Enigma has a four position rotary switch: external power, off, internal
power (dim lamps), and internal power (bright lamps). When using a fully
charged battery, the “dim” mode would be used to prolong battery life, and for
a partly-discharged battery, the “bright” mode would be used. We do not show
this switch in the circuits shown in this article; it is not relevant to cryptographic
security, but it is relevant to mention the switch in the sense that the operator was
evidently able to use additional switches, a point we will return to later.
To send a message, the Enigma rotors and plugboard were set up using a
complex process based on the key for the message, which was obtained from
a daily codebook. An operator would then type the message and read aloud
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the lamps as they lit on the Enigma, and another operator would transmit those
letters usingMorse code. To receive a message, another Enigma would be set up
correspondingly with the same rotor settings and plugboard wiring, then the
Morse code letters would be typed and the lit lamps read out so another oper-
ator could write down the message on paper as it was decoded letter by letter.
There are further operational details beyond the needs of the present
article, including some relevant for human factors analysis of Enigma oper-
ation (e.g., to understand the mechanism of the Herivelismus).
3.1. The number of permutations
Imagine walking up to an Enigma, knowing nothing about its internal workings.
How many ways might its wiring permute the key-lamp connections? Key A
could light any of 26 lamps, key B could light any of the remaining 25 lamps,
and so on; there are in principle 26× 25× 24…×1¼ 26! ≈ 4× 1026 potential ways
to wire up an Enigma for each configuration. Furthermore, each time a key is
pressed, the permutation will change to another from the same set of possibilities.
However, the Enigma is not designed like this. Instead, it provides a
reciprocal code so that ciphertexts can be decoded with the same key as the
plaintext has been encoded; thus, if A was coded as B then (in the same Enigma
configuration) B would be reciprocally (de)coded as A. The reciprocal con-
straint eliminates many of the possible permutations: There are only ≈ 5 × 1014
ways to connect the Enigma so it implements reciprocal codes.
Herivel argued that without reciprocal coding, the Enigma would have been
useless [10, p. 89]. In fact, a simple switch (see below) could have provided a
code/decode option, which would have retained the operational advantages of
reciprocal coding Herivel wanted, but without reducing the number of
permutations. It is worth emphasising that the number of permutations could
have been nearly squared by a minor modification to the Enigma wiring if
anybody had thought to design it that way.
If this design flaw had been fixed, the number of permutations would not
just be increased (by a factor of ≈ 1012), but insecure patterns in the permuta-
tions would also have been removed, in particular, undermining the diagonal
board optimisation of the automated Bombe decryption effort [32]. Breaking
the Enigma would have been very much harder, “almost, if not completely,
washed out” in Welchman’s words (quoted in full below), and as all the
hundreds of Bombes in use would have been impacted, this design improve-
ment would have drastically curtailed the volume of Allied intelligence.
The Enigma also has a self-coding weakness so no letter can code as itself,
hence removing all permutations containing any self-coding substitutions,
A↔A, B↔B, and so on. Interestingly, self-coding is reciprocal, so the self-
coding weakness eliminates some reciprocal weaknesses. There are only ≈ 8 ×
1012 permutations that are both reciprocal and have no self-coding.
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The derivation of this last number can be understood by considering the
rotor assembly (Figure 1), with its 26 connections to the rest of the Enigma.
The rotor assembly, in any configuration, shorts pairs of connections (e.g.,
connecting Y↔Z). Let p(n) be the number of pairs possible for n connections.
Clearly, p(2)¼ 1 as there is only one way to short two connections. For n
connections, pick one and it can be paired with any of the remaining n   1
connections, leaving n   2 connections to be paired up in p(n   2) ways; hence
p(n)¼ (n   1) × p(n   2). Now, p(26) is easily expanded as 25 × 23 × 21…×
1≈ 8× 1012.
In short, by these two design weaknesses, the complexity of the Enigma code
is reduced by a factor of ≈ 5 × 1013 (i.e., 4 × 1026 ÷ 8 × 1012) or (put another way)
reduced to less than the square root; either way, a dramatic reduction occurs. It
must be emphasised that these two weaknesses in the Enigma design, although
often confused, interrelated, and incorrectly explained, are independent
problems; they are independent, both cryptographically and electrically
(Figure 2).
The familiar huge numbers in the literature (e.g., 3 × 10114 in [21], etc.) arise
for two main reasons. First, most calculations multiply key configurations: For
example, the rotor choices and plugboard wiring are part of the key, but every
permutation they introduce has already been counted in the foregoing analysis;
Figure 1. Enigma wiring without a plugboard. This circuit, showing only 2 keys instead of the
full 26, is redrawn from a German Navy Enigma manual [13, p. 293]. (The wiring of the scrambler
[the reflector and rotors] is purely indicative: The original diagram does not show details of its
internal wiring. The actual scrambler has 26 connections to 26 letters, of course, not 10 as shown.)
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many key configurations represent the same permutation. Secondly, on each
key press the Enigma’s permutation changes, and counting message permuta-
tions assuming messages are arbitrarily long, enough for n rotors to go through
all of their 26n positions (though some rotors “double stepped,” hence reducing
this number), rather than letter permutations, as here, increases the numbers
further. Although it changes permutation on each key press, the Enigma
cannot thereby increase the number of possible permutations!
However they are calculated, these large numbers are misleading as
patterns (i.e., cryptanalytic knowledge) undermine them as a measure of
security: A systematic cryptanalytic attack does not waste time trying so many
permutations by brute force.
It seems very strange the Axis experts did not finish the line of thought: If it
cannot be broken by brute force therefore some other techniques may be used,
such as cribs or the dynamics of the rotor permutations (which the Bombes
exploited [32]), to say nothing of stealing rotors or key setting books.
3.2. The enigma wiring
The basic wiring of the Enigma is shown in Figure 1. This circuit, including the
layout, is taken directly from a German Navy manual [13, p. 293] and, inter-
estingly, makes the electrical inevitability of the self-coding weakness obvious:
If there were only two keys (and only two keys are shown in Figure 1), they can
only code as each other. The scrambler (the reflector and set of rotors) either
connects Y and Z in the diagram, or it does not. If it connects them, the coding
is trivial, and if it does not connect, then nothing happens at all.
In other words, a two-key Enigma is useless, which might have been a clue
that the 26-key Enigma had an underlying design flaw [27]. Figure 3 shows
that for a two-key Enigma all the plugboard does is swap two wires that are
anyway shorted by the rotor assembly: Even with a plugboard, it is still use-
less. As we shall later argue, the plugboard is wired into the wrong place,
which compromises its potential.
Figure 2. Example codes representing all four combinations of self-coding weakness (or not)
and reciprocal weakness (or not), illustrated with a four symbol alphabet, ABCD. The numbers
are the numbers of permutations satisfying the combinations of design constraint (on an Enigma,
every time a key is pressed the permutation changes to another within the constraints of the
design). The four cases demonstrate that self-coding and reciprocal weaknesses are independent
in principle; circuit diagrams in other figures in this article show that they are also electrically
independent even when based on Enigma-style wiring.
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Figure 1 does not show that the wiring from the keys to the rotors need not
be direct; as Welchman pointed out [32, p. 210], the wiring from the keyboard
(QWERTZ… by rows) was permuted into alphabetic order (ABCDEF…) as
it connected to the rotors. In the 1930s, the German Army introduced the
plugboard to allow an operator to change this permutation by rewiring. After
the plugboard was set up by the operator (e.g., once a day), it would not be
changed during a message.
The original plugboard cables were twin wires, and each cable effectively
swapped lamp/key pairs of letters (e.g., if key Y was swapped with key Z, then
lamp Y was also swapped with lamp Z), which obviously could not affect the
weaknesses of the Enigma.
The Uhr was introduced in 1944 and replaced ten plugboard cables
(offering ≈ 6 × 1020 permutations) with 20 separate wires. It then provided a
selection of just 40 prewired permutations, but it was no longer restricted
to paired swaps, and (once set up) the permutations were more easily changed
just by turning a 40-position rotary knob. The Uhr itself was not reciprocal,
but electrically it was in the same place as and behaved much like
adding another rotor, so it could not affect the weaknesses of the Enigma
as a whole.
In addition to split rotors [2], other developments included a rewirable
reflector also introduced in 1944 [31], which allowed arbitrary pairs of
Figure 3. Original Enigma circuit with plugboard. When no plug is in a socket (left), each socket
shorts its connections, so the wiring is unchanged. Connecting a cable (shown bottom right)
effectively swaps over the wires marked y and z. The two-key Enigma's behaviour is completely
unchanged whether or not a plugboard is used because swapping connected wires leaves them
still connected. (The circuit shows a standard jack socket symbol electrically equivalent to the
Enigma's original two-pin socket.)
186 H. THIMBLEBY
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [S
wa
ns
ea
 U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
8:1
1 1
8 J
uly
 20
16
 
connections (except J–Y, which remained fixed) and was rewired every ten
days, effectively increasing the number of rotors in the field dramatically.
These various developments show the Germans tried to make the Enigma
more secure, yet they did not impact its core weaknesses. The Germans were
focussing more on increasing complexity than on reviewing fundamental
assumptions. It is interesting to speculate what might have happened if basic
human factors engineering questions had been asked: What assumptions had
they, what was the evidence for these changes, would the increase in complexity
of use encourage workarounds that would undermine any supposed benefits, and
did they have a design checklist so they did not overlook critical design criteria
[8]? (Confirmation bias implies, unless one takes careful precautions such as
using a checklist, reasons why a solution may not work well will tend to be
ignored.) In the event, both innovations were quickly compromised because
operators had problems, and some messages were retransmitted (e.g., with and
without the Uhr), which of course creates a serious security compromise.
3.3. An example of exploiting the self-coding weakness
It was routine to send dummy transmissions to camouflage changes in traffic
volume before action, and in one case an Italian soldier sending a dummy
message could not be bothered to code a random message but instead just
pressed a single letter on his Enigma repeatedly. Mavis Batey (neé Lever),
working at Bletchley Park, noticed the Enigma intercept had no letter Ls,
and because of the self-coding weakness of the Enigma she realised the mess-
age was probably an idle transmission of just that letter, L. Testing this insight,
she was thus able to reconstruct the key of the message, and hence was able to
decrypt other messages [13, p. 139].
The following is from an Enigma operator’s manual:
VI. Typing mistakes and failures.
20. If mistakes happen during encryption by pressing the incorrect keys, omitting
letters, or double-typing of keys, or through failures of the machine, (lamps not light-
ing up) the encryption needs to be repeated from the beginning of the message. In
that case, the key in the windows must be reset to the initial state. To avoid repeating
the whole encryption process, if a mistake happens towards the end, it suffices to
press any key as often as letters have been encrypted before the mistake.” [17]
These instructions to “press any key as often as letters have been encrypted
before the mistake” seems like direct encouragement to repeat the mistake
Mavis Batey exploited! Requiring messages to be transmitted without error
puts pressure on the operators, and not only is this recommendation in the
operator manual bad practice, but retransmitting almost the same message
(i.e., the corrected message) under the same key is also ill-advised. This is to
say nothing of encouraging further errors that must then be corrected, further
increasing the risk of compromises. Obviously, some errors may be critical and
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need fixing, but simple spelling mistakes would be far better left uncorrected to
avoid retransmission.
Good human factors, as illustrated here, recognises that operators make
errors. Bad human factors engineering then requires operators to correct errors
insecurely. Good human factors engineering might have taken the instructions
in the manual for the operator (which prove somebody thought about the prob-
lem) as a hint for a feature for the designer to think about: perhaps put a key on
the Enigma to generate a random letter (e.g., by spinning a wheel).
3.4. Why were there weaknesses?
The Enigma has 26 keys and 26 lamps, and in a complicated way permutes
key presses into lamps lighting. With contemporary technology, in its full
generality this would require that 52 wires connect to a scrambling circuit
(on the Enigma, the plugboard, rotors, and reflector) unless advantage was
taken of technologies like Baudot, binary or multiple voltage representations
to add more information than on/off to the wires can support. The later
Baudot-based Geheimschreibers (Lorenz SZ40s, etc.) were too big and fragile
to be as conveniently portable as the Enigma was, so other solutions would
have been sought to the complexity.
The crucial electrical design decision in the Enigma was to use two-way
switches for the keys, which connected a common wire to either the battery
or to a lamp but not to both. When a key was not pressed, its lamp could come
on using the same wire. This design decision reduced 52 wires (26 keys plus
26 lamps) to just 26 wires, shared in pairs of keys and lamps. All the rest of the
circuitry could then be correspondingly simplified with half the number of
wires, seemingly very cost-effective. Figure 4 illustrates this deceptively
seductive design decision. Confirmation bias suggests that the Enigma design
Figure 4. (a) For an arbitrary substitution cipher, letters (keys) and encoded letters (lamps) must
be independent, so a letter's key and lamp each require separate connections, which means two
wires per letter: 52 connections in all. (b, c) The Enigma design (e.g., Figures 1, 3, and 5)
seductively halves the number of letter wires from 52 to 26. (Figure 10 shows how an Enigma
might have been designed with 52 wires.)
188 H. THIMBLEBY
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [S
wa
ns
ea
 U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
8:1
1 1
8 J
uly
 20
16
 
thought process (whether Scherbius or the Axis powers) would be unlikely to
look further for any potential problems in this design choice.
On the Enigma, if a key is pressed (letter Z is shown pressed in Figure 4b),
one terminal of the corresponding lamp is necessarily disconnected, so it
cannot light, hence the self-coding weakness. The reciprocal weakness also
follows because once each key and its corresponding lamp share a connection,
then the key and the lamp must behave the same way (key pressed and lamp
lit share a single wire, so they cannot be independent). For any key “A”:
. If key A is pressed, it disconnects lamp A, so lamp A cannot light, hence
the self-coding weakness.
. If key A makes lamp B light (A→B), say, then as A and B are connected
by a single wire, key B must make lamp A light (B→A), hence the
reciprocal weakness.
The plugboard as wired on this common key/lamp connection (Figure 3)
could not affect the weaknesses. Turing explained the Enigma using a diagram
similar to the one shown in Figure 5, and he immediately noted that if the result
of pressing a key P is that G lights, then pressing G in the same configuration
lights P (reciprocal weakness) and pressing G can never light G (self-coding
weakness). This behaviour remains true regardless of the scrambling of connec-
tions, including any scrambling introduced by the plugboard.
Since a wire (e.g., in the reflector) behaves the same in both directions, it
might seem that the weaknesses caused by the key switches could be circum-
vented by connections using diodes (which allow current to flow in only one
direction). However, this does not work, since if A→B (but not B→A because
of the diode) and, say, B →Z, then the two diodes will conduct in series, hence
Figure 5. The German Enigma, based on an explanatory circuit from Turing [28, p. 2]. Using
Turing's example, the key Q is pressed (shown by the C1 switch position), and supposing C1
and C3 are somehow connected through the scrambler, then lamp E lights. Turing glosses details
of the keyboard–plugboard–rotor–reflector wiring, which is here signified by the rectangular
block. (The keyboard and wiring is not in the modern QWERTY/QWERTZ order but enter the rotor
assembly in alphabetical order [32, p. 210].)
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A→Z as well, which would be incorrect. In short, it would be far easier to use
52 wires than work out ways of circumventing the problems caused by using
only 26 wires! One infers that the Germans did not realise there were problems
or that the cost of having 52 wires was excessive (though negligible compared
to the cost of losing a war). The Enigma looks like it works well with 26 wires,
and confirmation bias encourages the designers to believe it really works; why
bother looking for problems when there are so many advantages?
3.5. The weaknesses discussed in the literature
It is an oft-repeated misconception that the original reflector made the
Enigma reciprocal and forced the self-coding weakness. For example, in the
authoritative 2014 biography of Gordon Welchman, we find the following:
It was the reflector which delivered the reciprocal characteristic of the machine and
thus also guaranteed that a letter could not be encrypted as itself [the self-coding
weakness]. This was a weakness that the Germans were apparently prepared to accept
as it provided the machine with the extremely useful property that the encrypting and
decrypting processes were the same and one machine could do two tasks. This would
have greatly simplified the training of their Enigma operators. [9, p. 203]
In fact, the self-coding weakness does not follow from the reciprocal
characteristic. Rather, the problem is that a single wire for each letter connects
to the rotors, thanks to the key switch, and it is this that ensures the self-
coding weakness (Figure 4).
Even the training and ease of use issue is a misconception: Anybody
capable of operating it would surely not have found the distinction between
encrypting and decrypting a problem. Figure 6 shows “one machine could
do two tasks” can be achieved without any more than a simple switch.
It seems that focussing on what a hypothetical, non-reciprocal Enigma’s
key settings should be for decrypting is baffling, and probably inhibited
people both during the war and in the post-war literature from thinking of
modifying the design so the same key could be used for both encrypting
and decrypting processes.
Welchman himself wrote about the Enigma plugboard wiring [32, p. 168–169]:
Suppose that, at any point in the war, the Germans had simply issued sets of single-
ended connectors to replace the sets of double-ended ones. This would have meant
that the upper socket corresponding to each letter, say X, would be connected to the
lower socket of a specified letter, say Y. The lower socket corresponding to X would
also be connected to the upper socket of some letter, but this letter need not be Y.
[…] our ability to accomplish the actual codebreaking would have been almost, if
not completely, washed out […] the diagonal board would have been out of business.
This is incorrect. As we discussed above (section 3.4), no rewiring of the
plugboard as Welchman described (which amounts to a variant of the Uhr)
could have had this impact or affected the diagonal board. As Figure 5 makes
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clear, the plugboard, howsoever it might have been modified, plugged or
wired (while it remains in the same part of the Enigma circuit) cannot achieve
anything electrically more challenging than the restricted permutations
possible using any variation of rotors and reflectors. Even automatically rotat-
ing, they hardly challenged the diagonal board. We know from his arguments
with Thomas (Tommy) Flowers, the electronics lead on the Colossus, that
Welchman was not good at electronics [7], but this misunderstanding is still
a surprising claim from the inventor of the diagonal board.
Consider Figure 7, which is redrawn from F. L. Bauer’s authoritative
cryptography textbook [2, Figure 49, p. 107]. On the facing page, he said,
The rotor solution, however, had the consequence no letter can be encrypted as
itself. [2, p. 106]
This is mistaken: The problem is in the wiring of the switches, as is evident
from the figure and as we explained above. The circuit in Figure 7 shows that
pressing key e lights lamp M and that lamp E is disconnected, and therefore it
cannot light (see also the caption of Figure 5, which puts the argument in Turing’s
words). The problem is due to the key switch wiring, not to the rotor solution.
Figure 6. This elegant circuit uses original Enigma rotors and avoids both the self-coding and
the reciprocal weaknesses (note the new location of the plugboard). As an alternative to diodes,
either a more complex switch or a relay could be used, or even a rotor basket (see text). The point
is that in principle the weaknesses can be avoided. (If one requires the extra security of a choice of
reflector, either another rotor can be added or the techniques illustrated in Figure 10 may
be used.)
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Figure 7. The Enigma with a reflector, three rotors, and no plugboard, redrawn from [2, Figure
49, p. 107]. The state shown in the diagram is key E pressed and lamp M lit.
Figure 8. This simple variation of the Enigma, which has the plugboard connected directly to
the lamps instead of to the key switch common wires, avoids the self-coding weakness (it swaps
lamps alone, not lamps and keys as on the original). Had this design been considered, the obvious
next step would be to make the plugboard wiring change with the rotor to stop the self-coding
being fixed per message.
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3.6. Possible alternative designs
All the following ideas avoid various weaknesses. Most retain a reflector:
Again, the reflector has nothing to do with the problems (other than being
a part of the circuit).
. Figure 8 shows that changing the wiring position of the plugboard avoids
the self-coding weakness while retaining both the rotor and reciprocity
(more precisely, it has an avoidable self-coding weakness, dependent
on the plugboard wiring).
. Figure 9 shows that the original reflector can be used in a circuit that
achieves reciprocal coding but without the critical self-coding weakness.
The circuit relies on the special behaviour of neon lamps, described as
early as 1921 [19], and widely available during the war.
Figure 9. A simple alternative Enigma providing the original reciprocal coding but without the
self-coding weakness. The design uses the original reflector, but some rotors have a missing
connection (here, rotor 1 shows a missing connection). If key Y is pressed, neon Z lights except
that with probability 1/13 (not 1/26 without making other changes). The missing connection in
rotor 1 is selected, and neon Y lights instead. Note that although only one out of 26 pins in
the rotor is directly disconnected, another wire is effectively disconnected in the return path from
the reflector, hence two pins out of 26 are actually disconnected. The circuit works as follows: If
key Y is pressed and connects to Z, neon Z ionises and clamps the voltage across the neon Y
potential divider, so the voltage across neon Y is too low for it to ionise; otherwise, if key Y is
pressed and does not connect to any other lamp, the voltage is not clamped and is enough
for neon Y to ionise. (The battery must be perhaps 100 V instead of the original Enigma's 4 V.)
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. An elegant solution is to use diodes (wired as 26 bridge rectifiers), as in
Figure 6. Instead of physically reversing the rotors or needing a large
multipole switch or relay, a simple switch reverses the battery polarity
so the diodes then reverse all connections to the rotors. Note that diodes
were widely available; a circuit for a homemade wireless set using one was
published in 1935 [4]. Whether diodes would have been reliable enough
in the field is another matter; the point is that if there is one solution to a
problem, then others can be sought. For example, one or more relays
could be used (26 two-pole relays, 13 four-pole relays, or one relay with
52 poles, the former choices being easier to field service).
. Figure 10 shows that using rotors with 52 connections rather than 26
avoids both weaknesses. It does not have the reciprocal weakness, but
the reflector could be wired to ensure reciprocal coding if it was actually
required; for example, if key A connects to lamp B, then a wire must be
added in the reflector to connect key B to lamp A. No doubt this now
optional pattern in the mechanism would raise concerns as it is
obvious (at least in hindsight) that one does not want a cryptographic
mechanism with such patterned constraints. Of course, in the original
design the reciprocity was not optional, regardless of how the rotors
and reflector were wired.
Figure 10. If the keys and lamps are separately wired to the rotors in pairs, the weaknesses are
avoided despite using a reflector. The rotors still have 26 mechanical positions but with paired
contacts, as illustrated (right). The reflector connects the outer ring to the inner ring of contacts,
making a further permutation as it does so. The plugboard is only used once in the circuit, so its
original reciprocal weakness is avoided. For completeness (not shown because it makes the
diagram messy), this circuit needs either diodes as in Figure 6 or an encode/decode switch to
swap the lamps and keys.
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. In Figure 6, instead of doubling the rotor connections at one end, 26
normal connections can be made at each end. The rotors could then
be in a basket (as on the British TypeX) to be removed as a piece, so
when coding, the basket “points left,” and when decoding the basket
“points right.” A removable basket would have had further advantages:
It could have encouraged cryptographers to think of new operational
procedures, not just changing one rotor at a time, but using more bas-
kets, even changing them mid-message, and so forth. There could have
been a single two-way multipole switch (or relay) to achieve the same
effect as reversing the basket. This approach was used on the US
SIGABA machine.
4. Broader discussion
It is possible that the precise electrical behaviour of the Enigma was pretty
much a closed book to German cryptanalysts. Almost certainly, they would
all have been mathematicians, not least because mathematicians need less
space than engineers and are therefore cheaper [21, p. 189]. Whatever the
explanation, the electrical problems never came to proper attention.
Contemporary Allied analysts, too, seem confused in their modern
summaries of the issues. Welchman [32] said it would have been difficult
to avoid the self-coding design fault, and Herivel [10, p. 89] said the reciprocal
property was essential, specifically saying the Enigma would have been useless
without it. Yet, avoiding self-coding is trivial, and reciprocity (the ease of
use that the same machine can code and decode) can be achieved without
the Enigma’s reciprocal weakness (that the code itself is reciprocal), as we
showed.
Herivel seems to focus so much on ease of operational use that he failed to
realise (or if he realised he did not say) that adding a single switch to the
design could have provided the ease of use he thought essential and at the
same time would have avoided the reciprocal weakness. Given the depth of
his overall analysis, it seems surprising he did not criticise the Germans for
this oversight unless he, too, was blind to it (but, then, he is a mathematician
providing a mathematician’s analysis of the design, rather than an engineer
providing an engineer’s critique of it).
The modern, post-Ultra revelations, literature seems confused, too. There
are many leading publications (e.g., [2, 9, 21]) that inaccurately describe or
over-simplify the electrical properties of the Enigma (cf. Figure 7 from [2]
for an example discussed above).
Interestingly, the UK TypeX and the US SIGABA designs were different,
suggesting that the Axis powers could have had the same design insights
but for human factors limitations, or perhaps that the overwhelming emphasis
in the literature on the design of the Enigma and not its “competitors” has
CRYPTOLOGIA 195
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [S
wa
ns
ea
 U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
8:1
1 1
8 J
uly
 20
16
 
perhaps trapped thinking into some of the Axis blindspots. More charitably,
the explanations in the literature are “good enough,” and a precise discussion
of the Enigma’s historical wiring properties is generally of little interest, but
(as the present article emphasises) the clear understanding of the design
details at the right time would have been critical.
4.1. Fundamental design problems
All design involves multiple and generally conflicting trade-offs. For example,
the Enigma should be light and portable, but this design requirement must be
traded against its physical robustness: The lighter it is, the more fragile it
becomes. Two fundamental trade-offs seem to lie at the core of the problems
we have discussed with the Enigma.
First, the Enigma was designed and used by humans. Human factors is con-
cerned with relevant issues such as the ease, simplicity, and effectiveness of
those human processes, and these are well known to include factors such as
openness and clarity, clear objectives, and so on. On the other hand, the
Enigma was used in a theatre of war, where security and secrecy were
required, within a cautious framework of need to know; if anybody knows
clear objectives, they are a greater risk to security. In short, the easier and
more reliable a device is to design or use, the more it seems in conflict with
the paranoid goals of security. As it happens, unnecessarily, this unavoidable
tradeoff was tipped the wrong way (from the Axis point of view) by cultural
problems and blindspots to thinking clearly.
Second, the wiring was simplified to halve the number of wires needed.
This design choice would have made the Enigma lighter and simpler, and
correspondingly eased its production in large numbers. While those are
tactical gains, the design significantly reduced the number of permutations
the Enigma supported from the theoretical maximum. Worse, the way the
wiring was simplified introduced specific patterns that could be exploited
cryptanalytically. In particular, the Enigma’s weaknesses applied to every
message and key, and thus could be exploited in a one-time cryptanalytic
effort, for instance, preparing the Jeffreys Sheets or building the Bombe that
could then be applied to any message.
The operational advantage of reciprocal coding could have been weighed
against the security weakness it introduces, but of course this is an unasked
or pointless question if reciprocal coding is (or is thought to be) unavoidable.
Almost certainly, had the Germans thought through this, they would have
preferred security against ease of use (the Enigma already required several
trained operators, so issues of ease of use were arguably not that significant).
Indeed, the ease of use of the Enigma encouraged more use (e.g., for social
communications) than was prudent [21], so making it harder to use would
have made it more secure!
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4.2. But not just human factors engineering
Although the Enigma’s design weaknesses and their persistence were critical,
its design was not the only factor in its overall failure, as the following types of
issue make clear:
. Operational failings (conventional human factors problems) regardless of
the Enigma design itself, such as depths (identical messages retransmitted
using different keys), cribs, recycling of keys, and patterned behaviours
such as led to the Herivel Tip. Operational failings also arose from poor
operational procedures (human factors at play at management levels),
such as the counterproductive rules for selecting key settings (e.g., forbid-
ding “predictable” choices of rotor, such as remaining in the same place
two days running, but doing so reduces randomness and hence increases
predictability [25, p. 164]).
. Although extra rotors were introduced during the war, their mechanical
behaviour was never revised. It was a serious weakness that for most
messages at least one rotor remains stationary during use.
. Although reviewing the variations on Enigma designs would be a com-
plex diversion for this article, it is noteworthy that some pre-war models
did not suffer from the reciprocal weakness, some models had more ran-
dom rotor movement, and there was variation between the army, navy,
and air force models. In other words, better designs (and the knowledge
of a space of design options) were in principle available to encourage
more careful review of the chosen designs.
. While examples of possible Enigma decryption were investigated (and
generally absolved the Enigma and its operational security), the Germans
(particularly Hitler) were obsessed with human fallibility and imagined
betrayal from soldiers or spies [21]. An Axis signals director argued
[21, p. 152] that since “the deciphering of the Enigma is out of the
question,” the problem must be with people (possibly spies) operating
it! Ironically, as this article argues, the preventable weaknesses in the
Enigma design were themselves due to human fallibility.
. When there was suspicion the Enigma might have been compromised,
the Germans preferred alternate explanations of the incidents, such
as the Allies’ superior direction finding technology. Given the
acknowledged superiority of Allied direction finding, this was a more
comfortable explanation than exploring the denied weaknesses of the
Enigma.
. The Allies’ automated decryption technology was a generation ahead of
the manual, electromechanical Enigma, and therefore the Axis estimates
of the time to break it were unwittingly invalid.
. Various attempts to check the security of the Enigma [21] were brief
attempts to decrypt particular messages. The Germans did not
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re-examine the design. The attempts were ad hoc and brief (e.g., a few
weeks), whereas the Allies’ attempts were systematic and lasted the
entire war.
. The Axis powers held the false conviction that had the Enigma been bro-
ken, there would have been direct evidence of that fact. As it happens,
the Allies went to extraordinary lengths and deceptive ruses to conceal
the sources of their decrypted information.
. As late as 1982, the U.S. NSA director wrote to Gordon Welchman telling
him not to talk about the technical details of the Enigma [9, p. 165]. If
the Allies were wilfully ignorant (i.e., insistent on compartmentalising
Enigma secrets) decades after the war, perhaps there may also have
been a wilful ignorance of design issues during the war, a type of thinking
that would have been exacerbated by the Axis compartmentalisation.
An astonishing array of further human factors problems is described
brilliantly in Ratcliff’s Delusions of Intelligence [21]. The Axis powers, unlike
the Allies, had very compartmentalised, hierarchical, and competitive signals
intelligence units, so common problems were rarely spotted. Such problems
created a vicious circle, in that failure of the intelligence system led to less
respect for it and reduced resourcing, creating a spiral of ineffectiveness
and loss of prestige. When some successful intelligence did occur, jealousies
eclipsed it. This psychological set, including the groupthink where the
blindspots were enculturated and impossible to speak out about, conspired
to ensure thinking about the Enigma’s weaknesses was never effective. The
Axis culture was in complete contrast to the clear and open Allies’ culture
[32].
Given that the Allies had very similar cipher technologies, the problems
cannot have been entirely unilateral. Everyone, on both sides, believed that
physical security and secrecy was paramount. The Axis thought the Enigma
statistics and their understanding of the technology was sound, and hence
their improvements focussed on improving physical security and improving
secrecy (in the keys and operational procedures) rather than improving the
underlying technology [3, p. 336]. With asymmetric codes and a hindsight
understanding of the Kerckhoffs principles [14], we now know these assump-
tions were false.
Yet, the Axis powers had reasons to convince themselves, including not ques-
tioning their assumptions, that they were right about the Enigma’s design and
hence they sustained no persistent or creative attack on (i.e., serious thinking)
their own handiwork, whereas the Allies were motivated to find flaws and had
no delusions about the value of doing so. As both Herivel and Welchman make
very clear, the difference between success and failure was very narrow, often
seeming a matter of luck, but human factors tipped the balance away from
the Axis powers.
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5. Conclusions
The Enigma’s self-coding and reciprocal weakness could have been avoided
using contemporary technology. Whether our circuits would have helped dur-
ing the war is impossible to answer, but the insight that there were problems
to think about (and as shown here, thinking about them would have found
feasible solutions) might have been significant. Recognising any weakness
in the design may have stimulated thinking about other weaknesses, in the
design or the processes that led to the design, as well as in the design of
the Enigma’s operational protocols. Certainly some incidents (e.g., Mavis
Batey’s break) could have been avoided.
Even more powerfully, if the Axis powers had noticed they had been missing
insights, they might have reflected on the human factors failings that induced
those oversights. That sort of counter-factual insight might have had a far more
profound impact than just fixing technical defects in the Enigma’s design.
The Germans and others seemingly did not reason (or did not reason clearly
enough) about Enigma circuits, despite having simple electrical problems
staring them in the face. The Navy could have identified a problem early on,
since their widely-distributed circuit diagram was completely dysfunctional
as a cryptographic machine. The simplicity of Figure 1 (if anybody thinks
about it) makes this evident. Simple designs make problems evident: a point also
noted by Thimbleby during his design of a simplified Enigma [27].
The real Enigma was complex, and it simply grew in complexity rather than
anyone questioning its underlying design assumptions; its implicit assump-
tions are hard to see in the maze of wiring needed for 26 keys. Hence, complex
designs disguise problems, and crucially, they require more effort to build or
even partially understand, and therefore encourage cognitive dissonance, as
mentioned above: the failure to see or think about potential problems when
effort has been expended in creating those very problems. Whereas cognitive
dissonance is why we fail to admit or notice problems after the fact, implicit in
our discussion has been the psychological “tunnel vision” that complexity in
itself hinders people seeing potential problems in the first place: Design
requires so much concentration that designers lose what elsewhere is called
situational awareness [6] and lose sight of wider issues.
Stepping back a bit from the details, Peter Medawar has called science “the
art of the soluble” [18], in other words, recognising and addressing the
problems to be solved, but in the artificial sciences [24] there is a danger
the complexity of the things we build obfuscates the problems we might
otherwise be thinking about. Tony Hoare memorably expressed the choice:
There are two ways of constructing a system, one way is to make it so simple that
there are obviously no deficiencies, and the other way is to make it so complicated
that there are no obvious deficiencies. The first method is far more difficult. [11]
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In the present article, we have raised two types of simplicity, which might be
called abstract and concrete. There is the abstract simplicity that helps
one think more clearly, the simplicity to which Hoare referred, and which
the Germans failed to utilise even from their own abstracted circuit diagrams
of the Enigma. The other sort of simplicity occurs in the drive for concrete con-
struction (and, for example, lower costs, as in reducing 52 wires to 26): If the
second sort is prioritised, even implicitly, it leads to tunnel vision, and the first
sort may never have a chance to support clear thinking.
In war, the deficiencies you cannot see you should assume will be seen and
exploited by your enemies, and so it follows one ought to thoroughly explore
simple systems first in order to encourage broader thinking. More generally,
in any safety-critical design endeavour, one should surround oneself with
clear thinkers with different psychological perspectives whose thinking is less
likely to be drawn into one’s own loss of situational awareness, cognitive dis-
sonance, tunnel vision, and other human factors handicaps.
Alan Turing’s pre-war 1936 insight into the universality of computers [28],
then the Colossus, and other developments during and just after the war led to
today’s computers. Today, it is far easier to simulate an Enigma on a com-
puter than to reproduce the original electromechanical construction. There
are even open source projects, implemented on computers, that emulate phy-
sically realistic Enigmas, such as the Open Enigma project at www.opene-
nigma.com. GCHQ, the U.K. intelligence agency and successor to Bletchley
Park, has developed a similar app, Cryptoy, to introduce students to cryp-
tography. It demonstrates shift, substitution, and Vigenère codes, and simu-
lates an Enigma.
Of course, the modern computer’s removal of physical limitations side-
steps the trade-offs discussed above, as well as the need to make a crypto-
graphic device limited in any way like a real Enigma, but the fundamental
human factors problems remain: Both design and use are still subject to
human factors limitations. Computer bugs are all too familiar, and they per-
sist for many of the same reasons the design flaws of the Enigma persisted.
Finally, Herivelismus [10] (see section 2) should be considered one of the
landmarks of human factors, and the failure to design it out, correspondingly,
should be considered a landmark failure of human factors engineering. That
is, computer programs get too complex and confuse programmers in just the
same way the complexity of the Engima was confusing: Programmers too
often add complexity because it is easier to do so than thinking carefully.
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